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This guide covers security best practices for hardening Enclave deployments in production environments.

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Security Checklist

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Critical

  • Use STRICT security level for untrusted code
  • Enable AI Scoring Gate
  • Set memory limits
  • Configure timeouts
  • Validate all tool inputs
  • Run as non-root user
  • Enable end-to-end encryption
  • Implement rate limiting
  • Use network segmentation
  • Enable audit logging
  • Set up intrusion detection
  • Regular security updates

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Security Levels

Always use the appropriate security level:
LevelUse CaseRestrictions
STRICTUntrusted AI/user codeMaximum restrictions
SECURESemi-trusted automationHigh restrictions
STANDARDInternal toolsModerate restrictions
PERMISSIVETesting onlyMinimal restrictions
import { Enclave } from '@enclave-vm/core';

// For untrusted code - always use STRICT
const enclave = new Enclave({
  securityLevel: 'STRICT',
});

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Defense in Depth

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Layer 1: Input Validation

Validate code before it reaches Enclave: 
import { z } from 'zod';

const executeSchema = z.object({
  code: z
    .string()
    .min(1)
    .max(100000) // Limit code size
    .refine(
      (code) => !code.includes('__proto__'),
      'Suspicious code pattern detected'
    ),
  timeout: z.number().min(1000).max(300000).optional(),
});

app.post('/execute', async (req, res) => {
  const result = executeSchema.safeParse(req.body);
  if (!result.success) {
    return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Invalid request' });
  }
  // Proceed with validated input
});

​
Layer 2: Pre-Scanner

Block obvious attacks early: 
import { PreScanner, createPreScannerConfig } from '@enclave-vm/ast';

const scanner = new PreScanner(createPreScannerConfig('agentscript'));

function preScreen(code: string): boolean {
  const result = scanner.scan(code);
  if (!result.valid) {
    logger.warn('Pre-scan blocked code', {
      issues: result.issues,
    });
    return false;
  }
  return true;
}

​
Layer 3: AST Validation

Strict AST validation: 
import { JSAstValidator, createAgentScriptPreset } from '@enclave-vm/ast';

const validator = new JSAstValidator(
  createAgentScriptPreset({
    // Only allow specific globals
    allowedGlobals: ['callTool', 'Math', 'JSON', 'console'],

    // Block additional identifiers
    additionalDisallowedIdentifiers: [
      'fetch',
      'XMLHttpRequest',
      'WebSocket',
    ],

    // Strict loop configuration
    allowedLoops: {
      allowFor: true,
      allowForOf: true,
      allowWhile: false,
      allowDoWhile: false,
      allowForIn: false,
    },
  })
);

​
Layer 4: AI Scoring Gate

Detect suspicious semantic patterns: 
const enclave = new Enclave({
  scoringGate: {
    scorer: 'rule-based',
    blockThreshold: 70,
    warnThreshold: 40,
    onScore: (result) => {
      if (result.score >= 40) {
        logger.warn('Suspicious code pattern', {
          score: result.score,
          signals: result.signals,
        });
      }
    },
  },
});

​
Layer 5: Runtime Isolation

Maximum runtime isolation: 
const enclave = new Enclave({
  // Memory limit
  memoryLimit: 64 * 1024 * 1024, // 64MB

  // Execution timeout
  timeout: 30000, // 30 seconds

  // Tool call limit
  maxToolCalls: 50,

  // Iteration limit
  maxIterations: 10000,

  // Use worker pool for OS-level isolation
  adapter: createWorkerPoolAdapter({
    poolSize: 4,
    maxWorkerMemory: 128 * 1024 * 1024,
  }),
});

​
Layer 6: Output Sanitization

Sanitize all outputs: 
function sanitizeOutput(output: unknown): unknown {
  // Remove circular references
  const seen = new WeakSet();

  function sanitize(value: unknown): unknown {
    if (value === null || typeof value !== 'object') {
      // Truncate long strings
      if (typeof value === 'string' && value.length > 10000) {
        return value.slice(0, 10000) + '... [truncated]';
      }
      return value;
    }

    if (seen.has(value)) {
      return '[Circular]';
    }
    seen.add(value);

    if (Array.isArray(value)) {
      // Limit array size
      const limited = value.slice(0, 1000);
      return limited.map(sanitize);
    }

    const sanitized: Record<string, unknown> = {};
    for (const [key, val] of Object.entries(value)) {
      // Skip sensitive keys
      if (key.match(/password|secret|token|key/i)) {
        sanitized[key] = '[REDACTED]';
      } else {
        sanitized[key] = sanitize(val);
      }
    }
    return sanitized;
  }

  return sanitize(output);
}

​
Tool Security

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Input Validation

Always validate tool inputs: 
import { z } from 'zod';

const toolSchemas = {
  'users:get': z.object({
    id: z.string().uuid(),
  }),
  'users:list': z.object({
    limit: z.number().int().min(1).max(100).default(10),
    offset: z.number().int().min(0).default(0),
  }),
  'email:send': z.object({
    to: z.string().email(),
    subject: z.string().max(200),
    body: z.string().max(10000),
  }),
};

const enclave = new Enclave({
  toolHandler: async (name, args) => {
    const schema = toolSchemas[name];
    if (!schema) {
      throw new Error(`Unknown tool: ${name}`);
    }

    const result = schema.safeParse(args);
    if (!result.success) {
      throw new Error(`Invalid arguments: ${result.error.message}`);
    }

    return executeTool(name, result.data);
  },
});

​
Permission Control

Implement tool permissions per user: 
interface UserPermissions {
  tools: string[];
  limits: {
    maxToolCalls: number;
    maxDataSize: number;
  };
}

const enclave = new Enclave({
  toolHandler: async (name, args, context) => {
    const permissions = await getUserPermissions(context.userId);

    // Check tool access
    if (!permissions.tools.includes(name)) {
      throw new Error(`Tool ${name} not allowed for user`);
    }

    // Check limits
    if (context.toolCallCount >= permissions.limits.maxToolCalls) {
      throw new Error('Tool call limit exceeded');
    }

    return executeTool(name, args);
  },
});

​
Data Filtering

Filter sensitive data from tool responses: 
function filterSensitiveData(data: unknown): unknown {
  if (data === null || typeof data !== 'object') {
    return data;
  }

  if (Array.isArray(data)) {
    return data.map(filterSensitiveData);
  }

  const filtered: Record<string, unknown> = {};
  const sensitiveKeys = ['password', 'secret', 'token', 'ssn', 'creditCard'];

  for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(data)) {
    if (sensitiveKeys.some(s => key.toLowerCase().includes(s))) {
      continue; // Omit sensitive fields
    }
    filtered[key] = filterSensitiveData(value);
  }

  return filtered;
}

​
Network Security

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Isolation

Run Enclave in isolated network: 
# docker-compose.yml
services:
  enclave-runtime:
    networks:
      - enclave-internal
    # No external network access

  enclave-broker:
    networks:
      - enclave-internal
      - external

networks:
  enclave-internal:
    internal: true
  external:

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TLS Configuration

import { createServer } from 'https';
import { readFileSync } from 'fs';

const server = createServer({
  key: readFileSync('/certs/server.key'),
  cert: readFileSync('/certs/server.crt'),
  ca: readFileSync('/certs/ca.crt'),

  // Modern TLS settings
  minVersion: 'TLSv1.2',
  ciphers: [
    'ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256',
    'ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256',
    'ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384',
    'ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384',
  ].join(':'),
});

​
End-to-End Encryption

Enable E2E encryption for sensitive data: 
const client = new EnclaveClient({
  serverUrl: 'https://broker.example.com',
  encryption: {
    enabled: true,
    curve: 'P-256',
  },
});

​
Rate Limiting

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Per-User Limits

import { RateLimiterRedis } from 'rate-limiter-flexible';
import Redis from 'ioredis';

const redis = new Redis(process.env.REDIS_URL);

const rateLimiter = new RateLimiterRedis({
  storeClient: redis,
  keyPrefix: 'enclave_rl',
  points: 100, // 100 requests
  duration: 60, // per minute
});

app.use('/execute', async (req, res, next) => {
  try {
    await rateLimiter.consume(req.user.id);
    next();
  } catch {
    res.status(429).json({ error: 'Too many requests' });
  }
});

​
Per-Tool Limits

const toolLimits = new Map([
  ['email:send', { points: 10, duration: 60 }], // 10 emails per minute
  ['db:query', { points: 100, duration: 60 }], // 100 queries per minute
]);

async function checkToolLimit(userId: string, tool: string) {
  const limit = toolLimits.get(tool);
  if (!limit) return true;

  const limiter = new RateLimiterRedis({
    storeClient: redis,
    keyPrefix: `tool_${tool}`,
    ...limit,
  });

  try {
    await limiter.consume(userId);
    return true;
  } catch {
    return false;
  }
}

​
Audit Logging

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Comprehensive Logging

interface AuditLog {
  timestamp: string;
  userId: string;
  sessionId: string;
  action: string;
  details: Record<string, unknown>;
  result: 'success' | 'failure';
  errorCode?: string;
}

function logAudit(log: AuditLog) {
  // Send to secure logging system
  auditLogger.info(log);

  // Store for compliance
  auditStore.insert(log);
}

const enclave = new Enclave({
  toolHandler: async (name, args, context) => {
    const start = Date.now();
    let result: unknown;
    let error: Error | undefined;

    try {
      result = await executeTool(name, args);
      return result;
    } catch (e) {
      error = e as Error;
      throw e;
    } finally {
      logAudit({
        timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),
        userId: context.userId,
        sessionId: context.sessionId,
        action: `tool:${name}`,
        details: {
          args: sanitizeForLog(args),
          duration: Date.now() - start,
        },
        result: error ? 'failure' : 'success',
        errorCode: error?.message,
      });
    }
  },
});

​
Log Retention

// Configure log retention
const logConfig = {
  // Keep detailed logs for 30 days
  detailedRetention: 30,

  // Keep summary logs for 1 year
  summaryRetention: 365,

  // Archive to cold storage after 90 days
  archiveAfter: 90,
};

​
Container Security

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Dockerfile Best Practices

# Use specific version
FROM node:20.10-slim

# Run as non-root
RUN useradd -m -u 1001 enclave

# Set secure permissions
WORKDIR /app
COPY --chown=enclave:enclave . .

# Remove unnecessary packages
RUN apt-get purge -y --auto-remove \
  && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*

# Drop all capabilities
USER enclave

# Read-only filesystem
VOLUME ["/tmp"]

# Health check
HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s CMD curl -f http://localhost:3000/health || exit 1

EXPOSE 3000
CMD ["node", "--no-warnings", "dist/server.js"]

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Security Context

# k8s/deployment.yaml
spec:
  containers:
    - name: enclave
      securityContext:
        runAsNonRoot: true
        runAsUser: 1001
        readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
        allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
        capabilities:
          drop:
            - ALL

​
Secrets Management

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Environment Variables

Never hardcode secrets: 
// Bad
const apiKey = 'sk-1234567890';

// Good
const apiKey = process.env.API_KEY;
if (!apiKey) {
  throw new Error('API_KEY not configured');
}

​
Kubernetes Secrets

apiVersion: v1
kind: Secret
metadata:
  name: enclave-secrets
type: Opaque
data:
  api-key: base64-encoded-value
  redis-url: base64-encoded-value

# deployment.yaml
env:
  - name: API_KEY
    valueFrom:
      secretKeyRef:
        name: enclave-secrets
        key: api-key

​
Incident Response

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Detection

Monitor for anomalies: 
// Alert on unusual patterns
const alerts = {
  highErrorRate: (rate: number) => rate > 0.1, // >10% error rate
  unusualToolUsage: (count: number) => count > 1000, // >1000 calls/min
  memorySpike: (mb: number) => mb > 500, // >500MB
  longExecution: (ms: number) => ms > 60000, // >60s
};

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Response Plan

  1. Detect - Automated monitoring alerts
  2. Contain - Isolate affected components
  3. Investigate - Review audit logs
  4. Remediate - Fix vulnerability
  5. Recover - Restore normal operation
  6. Learn - Post-incident review